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I. Introduction
In the 1990s the US hospital industry consolidated. Figure 1 displays the mean
population-weighted hospital Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the number of
horizontal mergers, acquisitions and hospital system expansions for Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs). The average HHI increased from .1888 in 1990 to .2772 in
2003, with the vast majority of the increase due to hospital consolidation. On average
there were 58 hospital mergers within MSAs in any given year with the peak of the wave
occurring in 1996 when there were 108 consolidations. 1
This paper estimates the impact of hospital consolidation on welfare. For the
purposes of quantifying the price impact of consolidations on the under-65 population,
hospitals are modeled as an input to the production of health insurance. In order to better
understand the roles of upstream and downstream market structures in determining the
impact of upstream horizontal mergers, we also make a modest contribution to the theory
of mergers in industries that are inputs to the final consumption good.
We examine hospital consolidations for several reasons. First, over the decade of
the 1990s a wave of consolidation occurred but this wave was not uniform across hospital
markets. In approximately 45% of the MSAs there was no change in market structure due
to consolidation. Furthermore, in those markets in which a consolidation took place there
is substantial variation in the change in market structure. Thus, the hospital industry
provides a nice case study of the impact of horizontal mergers because we observe many
markets with varying amounts of consolidation.

1

We use the term “consolidation” to refer to all combinations of previously independent organizations, e.g.
mergers, acquisitions, consolidations and hospital system expansions. For stylistic reasons we sometimes
use the term “merger” to refer to the same set of combinations.
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Second, understanding competition in the hospital industry is important in its own
right. Inpatient hospital care comprises 31% of total US health care expenditures (Smith
et al., 2005). Furthermore, hospitals are the second largest 3-digit North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry in the US with over $509 billion in
annual revenue in 2002 or 4.9% of Gross Domestic Product (NAICS Code 622, US
Census Bureau, 2004). 2 Thus, merger activity in the hospital industry not only provides
an opportunity to test theory, but also may exert a substantial impact on aggregate
economic activity.
Our model predicts that horizontal mergers in upstream markets will have larger
consequences for consumer prices, hence welfare, the more competitive the downstream
market. That is, the fewer competitors downstream the more an upstream merger simply
transfers monopoly rents from the downstream firms to the upstream firms.
The hypothesis that the welfare consequences of upstream mergers are a function
of downstream competition is supported by our empirical analysis. Hospital mergers led
to an increase in HMO premiums for those HMOs that operated in the most competitive
markets. However, on average, we find no effects of hospital mergers on premiums for
HMOs that operate in markets with few competitors. Our estimates indicate that the
aggregate impact of hospital mergers is modest but not trivial. In 2001, average HMO
premiums are estimated to be 3.2% higher than they would have been absent any hospital
merger activity during the 1990s. In relatively competitive HMO markets, premiums are
5.3% higher than they would have been with no merger activity.
Our most important finding is that these premium increases have consequences
for the quantity and source of health insurance acquired by the under-65 year old
2

The largest 3-digit industry is ‘motor vehicles parts and dealers’ with $804 billion in revenues.
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population. We match MSA-level merger information to the Current Population Survey
(CPS) from 1990 to 2003 to analyze the impact of hospital mergers on insurance status.
We find that hospital mergers in MSAs with relatively competitive HMO markets led to
decreases in private health insurance and increases in the population without health
insurance. However, in markets with weak HMO competition, hospital mergers did not
appear to affect the amount of private health insurance coverage or the number of the
uninsured. Hospital mergers in such markets appear to transfer rents from HMOs to
hospitals.
The estimated impacts of hospital mergers on private health insurance take-up and
the uninsured population are also modest but not trivial. In 2003, we estimate that
because of hospital mergers the likelihood of having private insurance declined by
approximately .46 percentage points, reducing private health insurance rolls by 695,000
lives. From 1990 to 2003, we estimate that hospital mergers resulted in a decline in
private health insurance of 5.8 million life years.
Our estimates indicate that the vast majority of those who exited private insurance
joined the ranks of the uninsured. In our sample of CPS data, in 2003 the rate of
uninsurance among 22 to 62 years olds was .178. We estimate that hospital mergers since
1990 led to an increase in the 2003 uninsurance rate of approximately .43 percentage
points. This translates into an extra 650,000 individuals lacking health insurance because
of hospital consolidations that occurred over the previous 14 years. From 1990 to 2003,
we estimate that hospital mergers increased the uninsured population by 5.5 million lifeyears.

3

We use our estimates of changes in premiums and insurance take-up to calculate
rough estimates of consumer surplus loss for adults due to hospital mergers. Between
1990 and 2001, our estimates imply that hospital mergers resulted in a loss of consumer
surplus of over $42.2 billion. In 2001, consumers lost over $7.3 billion surplus or
approximately $50 per capita. While the loss of consumer surplus is substantial, the total
welfare loss due to hospital consolidation over this period is estimated to be a modest
$95.4 million. The reason for the much smaller dead weight loss is that, consistent with
the previous literature, our estimates imply that the demand for health insurance is
inelastic, the premium increase is modest and the “revenue base” for the premium
increase (i.e. the size of the population with health insurance) is quite large.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few papers that have estimated the
welfare consequences of horizontal mergers for consumers. There is a modest literature
examining the effects of consummated mergers on prices, but few papers have
documented quantity (or quality) consequences of mergers which are necessary to assess
welfare effects. Antitrust laws have existed for over 110 years, yet there is surprisingly
little empirical evidence on the consequences of mergers that can be used to hone
competition policy. 3
The next section briefly summarizes the theoretical and empirical literatures on
mergers. Section III presents a very simple model of the consequence of upstream
mergers. Section IV discusses the empirical framework and Section V describes the data.
Section VI presents estimation results and Section VII concludes.

3

As Gurrea and Owen (2003) state: “The sad truth is that despite endless calls for empirical study of the
effects of mergers and of antitrust enforcement of section 7, there is very little empirical evidence
demonstrating the effects of mergers (or enjoining mergers) on consumer welfare.”
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II. Literature
A. Theoretical Literature
At least since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, many economists and
public policy makers have suspected that market power can have deleterious effects on
markets and that mergers are one mechanism by which firms can achieve market power.
Marshall (1920) provided an early formalized basis for this belief. However, Stigler
(1950) noted that while mergers may increase market power, the incentives for firms to
consolidate are mitigated by the presence of an externality. In a symmetric equilibrium,
all non-merging firms in the market gain more from a merger than the merging parties. In
a paper that has significantly impacted antitrust thought, Williamson (1968) showed that
mergers that generate efficiencies, even if they create substantial market power, can be
welfare enhancing.
In more recent analysis, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) formalize the ideas
of Stigler and show in a simple Cournot model that unless there are efficiencies or that
firms achieve duopoly market power, a merger will not be privately profitable. McAfee
and Williams (1992) Deneckere and Davidson (1985) Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell
and Sharpiro (1990) all model the welfare consequences of privately profitable mergers
in a static framework. A synthesis of the results from these papers is that privately
profitable mergers can either decrease or increase welfare. Gowrisankaran (1999) models
endogenous mergers in a dynamic framework with firm entry and exit, and he shows that
antitrust enforcement can enhance welfare. That is, the result that mergers can reduce
welfare is robust to dynamic considerations.

5

B. Empirical Literature
While the theoretical literature is relatively rich and there is a very large empirical
literature measuring the relationship between market concentration and prices, there are
relatively few studies of the realized consequences of actual mergers on prices and
quantities. This literature focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on three industries:
airlines, banking, and hospitals. Borenstein (1990); Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1991)
and Kim and Singal (1993) all find that airline mergers in the 1980s led to price
increases. Prager and Hannan (1998) find that the deposit rates offered by banks
operating in markets in which substantial horizontal consolidation occurred fell less than
for banks operating in markets in which consolidation did not occur. Berger, et al. (1998)
estimates that bank mergers led to a decline in small business lending by the merging
institutions, which was offset as competing banks increasing their lending over time.
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find that Italian bank mergers initially caused consumer
welfare to decline but over time the merging firms were able to achieve efficiencies that
led to a long run increase in welfare. Using structural methods, Pesendorfer (2003)
estimates the welfare impact of the wave of mergers in the paper industry during the mid1980s. He finds these mergers led to both static and dynamic efficiencies that yielded
significant consumer and producer surplus gains.
In sum, the empirical literature estimating the impact of mergers on prices and
quantities from non-hospital industries suggests that they often lead to price increases.
However, the works of Focarelli and Panetta (2003) and Pessendorfer (2003) are an
important caveat to this conclusion—mergers can lead to efficiencies that benefit both
consumers and producers. This work highlights (and expands) the empirical relevance of

6

the theoretical point Williamson (1968) made 35 years earlier. Next, we turn our attention
to the hospital competition literature.
Since the 1980s a large literature has evolved devoted to the impact of hospital
competition on inpatient prices paid by insurers. Several papers have examined the
impact of mergers on prices while a larger literature uses the cross sectional variation in
market structure to identify the impact of competition on prices. More recently,
researchers have estimated structural models and simulated the impact of hospital
mergers on price. We briefly review this literature below.
Several papers have used a pre/post research design to assess the impact of
hospital mergers on hospital costs and the price of inpatient care paid by insurers. The
typical finding is that mergers appear to reduce costs. Using data from 1986 to 1994,
Connor, et al. (1997) find that hospital mergers decrease expenditures and revenues per
admission by 4%. They interpret their results as implying that hospital mergers achieve
significant efficiencies. Consistent with this result, Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) find
that mergers where hospitals combine financial statements result in significant cost
reductions. Using a very limited sample of hospital mergers, Capps and Dranove (2003)
find that hospital consolidations led to increases in hospital prices that are greater than the
median increase in hospital prices. Vita and Sacher (2001) analyze the impact of the
Dominican Santa Cruz Hospital’s acquisition of its sole competitor in Santa Cruz, CA,
AMI-Community Hospital and find that the merger led to price increases of roughly 15%.
More recently, in an analysis that corrects for the endogeneity of mergers, Dafny (2005)
finds that hospitals that are located within 7 miles of a merging rival raise prices by 40%
post-merger. Finally, relying on interviews of health care executives and policymakers,

7

Devers et al. (2003) argue that hospital negotiating leverage with health insurers
increased substantially from 1996 to 2000 and that hospital consolidation was a prime
contributor to the increase in hospital bargaining power.
Two papers employ structural approaches to estimate the impact of hospital
mergers on price. Using different estimating strategies, Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and
Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) find that hospital mergers in an urban setting
can lead to significant price increases. Gaynor and Vogt (2003) simulate a merger in San
Louis Obispo County that would create a monopoly and estimate that such a transaction
would increase price by 53%. Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) simulated a
merger between two hospitals in La Jolla, CA and predicted that it would lead to a 6%
price increase.
Research on the relationship between hospital concentration and prices generally
finds that an increase in hospital concentration is correlated with higher prices for
inpatient care, and many interpret this correlation as a causal relationship. This literature
primarily relies on cross-sectional variation in hospital concentration to identify the
relationship between concentration and the price paid by insurers. The source of
identification in this approach has been criticized, but nevertheless this body of work
provides much of the evidence on the impact of hospital competition. Comprehensive
reviews of this literature can be found in Dranove and Satterthwaite (2000) and Gaynor
and Vogt (2000). According to Gaynor and Vogt (2000), the estimates from this literature
imply that an increase in the HHI from .20 to .28 will lead to price changes that range
between -3% and 17% with the average (unweighted) price increase across the estimates
of roughly 4%.

8

In sum, the empirical literature suggests that hospital mergers in concentrated
markets can lead to price increases for inpatient care. However, the estimated magnitudes
of these price increases vary considerably. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has
been made to measure the impact of hospital mergers on the welfare of the final
consumer. 4

III. A Simple Theory of the Effect of Upstream Mergers
The literature studying the impact of non-vertical, upstream mergers on
downstream markets is sparse. 5 Given the lack of analytical results to draw upon, the
purpose of this section is to build some theoretical guidance for our empirical
specification. We posit the simplest model that can highlight the relationships between
market structures and prices in two linked markets. We make many assumptions
forsaking realism for simplicity. Specifically, we do not model that HMOs often
selectively contract with hospitals and that HMOs and hospitals engage in bargaining
relationships. 6 We assume that the demand for HMO coverage is linear and the
production technology for an HMO uses two inputs in fixed proportions (that is, in order
to sell a policy an HMO must use both physician and hospital inputs in fixed
proportions); and we assume both hospital services and HMO coverage are homogeneous
goods.
We assume that there are N downstream HMOs and M upstream hospitals. The
market for physician services is treated as perfectly competitive and thus price is set at

4

Several papers have examined the impact of changes in hospital concentration on the quality of care. For
example, see Kessler and McClellan (2000).
5
Two works that are relevant are Inderst and Wey (2003) and Blair and Harrison (1993).
6
Ho (2006) models the formation of HMO hospital networks.

9

marginal cost. Both HMOs and hospitals are Cournot competitors, choosing output while
taking the output choices of their competitors as given.
The market demand for HMO services is given by PHMO = A − bQHMO where PHMO
is the price of HMO services and QHMO is the market quantity of HMO services
⎛w f⎞
purchased. The cost function for a given HMO is C(qi ) = qi ⎜ + ⎟ where w is the
⎝α β⎠

price of a hospital day (which is endogenous in our model), f is the price of a physician
visit, and α , β are production function parameters. The HMO takes the prices of hospital
and physician services as given. That is, there is no bargaining between the upstream and
downstream firms.
The HMO objective function is simply:
(1)

M ax qi P (Q ) qi − C ( qi )

The first order conditions are:
⎛w f ⎞
A − bQ − bqi = ⎜ + ⎟
⎝α β ⎠
Assuming HMOs are identical and a symmetric equilibrium implies that a HMO’s supply
(2)

function and the aggregate supply function are given by:
(3)

qi =

⎛
1
w f ⎞
⎜ A− − ⎟
b( N + 1) ⎝
α β⎠

Qi =

N ⎛
w f
⎜ A− −
α β
b( N + 1) ⎝

and
(4)

⎞
⎟.
⎠

The equilibrium HMO price is then:
(5)

PHMO = A −

N ⎛
w f ⎞
⎜ A− − ⎟
( N + 1) ⎝
α β⎠
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From the equilibrium HMO supply function we can derive the aggregate derived demand
for hospital days, H, as:
(6)

H=

⎛
N
w f ⎞
⎜ A− − ⎟ .
α b( N + 1) ⎝
α β⎠

The inverse demand for hospital days is simply:
(7)

⎛
α b( N + 1)
f
w =α ⎜ A−
H−
N
β
⎝

⎞
⎟.
⎠

Turning to the upstream market, hospitals take the derived demand (7) as the
market demand for their output. The hospital’s objective function is:
(8)

M ax hi w( H ) hi − C (hi )

The first-order conditions, after substituting in the derived demand, are:
(9)

⎛

α b( N + 1)

⎝

N

α ⎜ A−

H−

f ⎞ α 2b( N + 1)
−
hi = mch .
β ⎟⎠
N

Assuming a symmetric Nash equilibrium gives the individual and market supply curves
for hospital services:

(10)

⎛
⎞⎛
mch f ⎞
N
− ⎟
hi = ⎜
⎟⎜ A −
α
β⎠
⎝ ( M + α )( N + 1)b ⎠ ⎝

and
(11)

⎛
⎞⎛
mch f ⎞
NM
H =⎜
− ⎟
⎟⎜ A −
α
β⎠
⎝ ( M + α )( N + 1)b ⎠ ⎝

Substitution into market derived demand yields:
(12)

⎛
⎛ M ⎛
mc f ⎞ ⎞ f ⎞
w = α ⎜ A −α ⎜
A−
−
⎟− ⎟
⎜
⎜
α β ⎟⎠ ⎠ β ⎟⎠
⎝ (M + α ) ⎝
⎝
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Substituting back into the HMO inverse demand gives the HMO price as a function of the
HMO and hospital market structure:
(13)

PHMO = A −

N ⎛ αM ⎛
mc f
−
⎜
⎜ A−
( N + 1) ⎝ ( M + α ) ⎝
α β

⎞⎞
⎟⎟
⎠⎠

The downstream equilibrium price is a function of the product of the upstream
and downstream market structures. In this framework, the impact of a hospital merger on
HMO prices and thus welfare depends not only on the hospital market structure but on
the HMO market structure as well. Specifically,
(14)

ΔPHMO
ΔM

⎞⎛
N ⎛⎛
mc f
α2
=
−
⎜⎜ ⎜
⎟⎜ A −
( N + 1) ⎝ ⎝ ( M + α )( M − 1 + α ) ⎠ ⎝
α β
ΔM =−1

⎞⎞
⎟ ⎟⎟ .
⎠⎠

Given our assumptions, as the HMO market becomes more competitive, the impact of a
given hospital consolidation on HMO prices increases. 7 That is, while total welfare will
be lower when the HMO market is more consolidated (there is double marginalization),
the change in welfare from the marginal merger will be lower when the HMO market is
more concentrated. This is the key insight from this highly stylized theory that we use to
guide the data analysis. The impact of hospital mergers on welfare is a function of the
interaction of HMO and hospital market structure.

IV. Empirical Framework
We are interested in estimating the impact of hospital mergers on HMO premiums
and the quantity of health insurance purchased. We use two units of analysis. First, the

7

This result is sensitive to the assumptions about the functional form of demand. In a constant elasticity of
demand framework, as the HMO market becomes more competitive, the impact of a given hospital
consolidation on HMO prices decreases. However, as we discuss below, the implication of the model using
a linear demand framework is the one that turns out to be empirically relevant.
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impact of hospital mergers on HMO premiums is examined with the HMO as the unit of
analysis. Second, the impact of hospital mergers on health insurance purchase is
examined with the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) or Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) as the unit of analysis. 8 The primary data source for hospital
consolidations is the American Hospital Association (AHA). Information on
consolidations is merged with HMO level data for the first analysis and the Current
Population Survey (CPS) data at the MSA level for the second analysis.
A. HMO Premiums
To investigate the impact of hospital consolidations on HMO premiums we
estimate parameters from the following HMO-level regression:
(15)

log p jt = μ j + α1 log MergerHHI jt + α 2 log NHMO jt + β X jt +

2001

∑ φ year + ε

t =1991

t

t

jt

where pij is the average premium charged by HMO j across all of the markets it
participates in period t, MergerHHI jt is the enrollment-weighted average hospital
“merger” Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. We discuss the “merger” component of the
construction of this variable below. NHMOij is the population-weighted average number
of HMOs operating in the Health Services Area (HSA) over all the counties served by the
HMO, Xjt are variables that measure the characteristics of the HMO that may impact its
costs and product quality and average characteristics of the markets it serves that may
impact its costs and/or the market demand. The variable yeart is an annual dummy
variable—our HMO data span the period 1990 to 2001. The HMO-specific error term,

μ j may be correlated with the right hand side variables and in particular MergerHHI jt

8

We refer to PMSA and MSAs generically as MSAs.
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and NHMOij . Since some unobserved characteristics of HMO pricing behavior may be
correlated with their propensity to experience hospital mergers or the amount of direct
competition they face, we estimate the parameters of (15) using a standard fixed-effects
estimator. To calculate consistent standard errors in the presence of auto-correlated
residuals we bootstrap the estimates.
We use HMOs as the downstream seller of health insurance and the number of
HMOs as the measure of health insurance market structure; however, there are a number
of possible measures of health insurance and of market structure, so our choices deserve
justification. We focus on HMOs as opposed to all possible forms of health insurance
because information on HMOs is available at the MSA level while information on the
number of other types of insurers is available only at the state level. The lack of data on
other forms of health insurers should not affect our results. Through the use of selective
contracting HMOs are the health insurance organizational form that generates the greatest
hospital price sensitivity — the rise of HMOs is credited with introducing price
competition into the market for hospital services (Gaynor and Vogt, 2000). Thus, the
number of HMOs (or some other indicator of HMO market structure) is likely a better
measure of the degree of price competition hospitals face than the total number of health
insurers.
We measure HMO market structure using the number of independent
organizations as opposed to a HHI index as we can count this with little error. Calculating

14

a HHI requires assumptions regarding the distribution of enrollees over a HMO’s service
area and likely can only be measured with non-trivial error. 9
The theory outlined above suggests that the impact of a change in the number of
hospitals on HMO prices will be a function of HMO market structure. To capture this
possibility we split the data in three different samples based on the 1995 mean value
of NHMOij . The cut-offs are chosen so that they roughly correspond to thirds of the CPS
data sample. The samples are zero to six HMOs, seven to nine HMOs, and ten or greater
HMOs. The theory of the previous section suggests that in the most competitive HMO
markets, the coefficient on MergerHHI jt should be positive—an increase in hospital
market concentration should increase HMO premiums in those markets.
B. Health Insurance
We estimate the impact of mergers on the probability than an individual will have
private and any health insurance a using a linear probability model. Letting Iimt denote the
insurance status indicator for individual i in MSA m in period t we estimate parameters
from the following equation:
(16)

I imt = λm + φ1MergerHHI mt + φ2 ln NHMOmt + δ Wimt +

2003

∑γ

t =1991

t

yeart + ν imt ,

where λ m is an MSA fixed effect, NHMOmt is the number of HMOs operating in the
MSA, Wimt is a vector that includes a rich set of individual demographic controls and
MSA-level characteristics and vmt is the residual. The parameter φ1 measures the impact
of hospital mergers on the likelihood of insurance take-up and is the parameter of primary
interest.
9

To test the robustness of our results to different specifications, we included an HMO HHI Index in the
premium regression. The results of this estimation are qualitatively identical to those we present here.
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As in the HMO premium analysis, we follow the theory by estimating the
parameters of (16) separately for three different samples, split roughly by thirds of the
population-weighted number of HMOs in 1995. 10 The samples are zero to six HMOs,
seven to nine HMOs, and ten or greater HMOs.
C. Hospital Market Structure and Mergers
Our main right-hand-side variable of interest in both empirical specifications
is MergerHHI mt which measures the accumulated change in hospital bed-based
concentration solely due to consolidation. The advantage of using this measure over the
more common HHI is that the standard HHI is more prone to endogeneity even
controlling for location fixed effects. For example, hospital exits and changes in the
distribution of beds are likely correlated with changes in hospital demand and those
changes, in turn, may be related to shocks in insurance coverage. Of course, changes in
MergerHHI mt could be correlated with unobserved insurance shocks, but, as we discuss
below, the evidence we can bring to bear suggests changes in MergerHHI jt are
exogenous.
At the market level, MergerHHI is calculated by taking the market shares of
hospital physical plants in 1990 and then assigning those hospitals to the organization to
which they belong in year t. Letting sm,1990 denote the market share based on the staffed
bed size of organization m in 1990,
M

(12)

MergerHHI mt = ∑ sm1990 (Omt ) 2
m =1

10

We explored using different years to define the three different samples. The qualitative results are
unaffected by the choice of years used to define the samples.
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where Omt is the ownership/system structure of hospitals in period t. While MergerHHI mt
is highly correlated with the traditional HHI, the change in MergerHHI mt over time is
solely due to changes in ownership and hospital system structure. This measure treats
exiting hospitals as remaining in the market and does not include new entrants in the
measure of concentration. The vast majority of the change in the standard HHI in our data
is due to mergers. Thus, while we think it useful to separate changes in the HHI due to
consolidation, our results are robust to using a standard HHI measure. 11
D. Identification
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission were not passive
observers of the hospital merger wave in the 1990s. Both agencies brought several suits
attempting to enjoin hospital mergers and in each case the courts sided with the hospitals.
The courts’ rulings effectively implied that hospital were to be held to a more lenient
antitrust standard than other industries (Greaney, 2002). 12 In fact, the antitrust agencies’
failure in court may have precipitated the merger wave. Because of the reduced antitrust
scrutiny hospital mergers enjoyed over this period, our sample of hospital mergers is not
a selected sample of transactions that would typically need to pass traditional antitrust
scrutiny. That is, the hospital industry over this period serves as an experiment of the
welfare consequences of significantly reduced antitrust oversight.
Our key identifying assumption is that ε jt and υimt are uncorrelated with
MergerHHI in the HMO premium and health insurance analysis, respectively. It is
11

We considered using Merge rHHI as an instrument for the standard HHI measure in an instrumental
variables regression and our qualitative conclusions are robust to this specification.
12
This string of losses was recently reversed in a case brought by the Federal Trade Commission. In FTC v.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation (2005) (File No. 011 0234, Docket No. 9315) the Court
ruled in favor of the FTC and ordered previously consolidated hospitals to de-merge. This case is currently
under appeal.
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reasonable to ask under what other scenarios the shocks to HMO premiums, ε jt , and the
shocks to health insurance status, υimt , are correlated with MergerHHI jt and how likely
are those scenarios?
In the HMO analysis, positive HMO demand shocks mean the potential rents a
hospital can extract via merger have increased and may overcome any transaction costs.
However, hospital mergers are very complex transactions taking years to initiate,
negotiate and complete and inherently embody significant uncertainty over the time to
completion. It would be very difficult for these organizations to forecast demand shocks
and time their merger to take advantage of those shocks. However, if these shocks are not
independent over time, then it plausible they could be correlated with MergerHHI jt . If
this were the case, we should expect MergerHHI jt to be correlated with other, more easily
observed, demand and cost side variables. Also, if the shocks are foreseeable and unless
hospitals can accurately time the consummation of their transaction, then leads and lags
of MergerHHI jt should be correlated with HMO premium. This logic suggests that
another indirect test of our specification is to estimate the model with leading and lagged
values of MergerHHI jt .
We estimated a fixed-effects regression of HMO-level demand (average HMO
penetration, average logarithm of population, average size distribution of firms, number
of physicians, percent Medicare, percent Medicaid, and nurses’ wages) on MergerHHI jt .
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that hospital consolidations are
uncorrelated with HMO demand and cost shifts. None of the coefficients on demand and
cost variables were significant at traditional levels of confidence. That is, MergerHHI jt is
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uncorrelated with the observable measures of demand and costs. This provides some
indirect evidence that MergerHHI jt is exogenous.
In addition, we estimated the coefficients in (15) including leading and lagged
values of MergerHHI jt to test whether there are premium shocks that are autocorrelated
with MergerHHI jt but are unrelated to hospital merger activity. In all specifications the
coefficients on the leading and lagged values of MergerHHI jt are insignificant. This
suggests that any endogeneity that would confound our findings must be
contemporaneous with the merger activity and that strikes us as unlikely.
Likewise in the insurance take-up analysis, identification of the impact of hospital
mergers comes from within-MSA variation in hospital merger activity. While we control
for time-invariant, unobserved differences across MSAs and we include a rich set of
demographic and geographic controls, it is nevertheless reasonable to ask
if MergerHHI mt is correlated with shocks to health insurance status. For example, a
possible source of endogeneity is that markets that experience other disruptions that
affect insurance status also experience more merger activity.
While such endogeneity is plausible, we found little indirect evidence for it. For
example, observable demand proxies do not appear to be correlated with MergerHHI mt .
Town, et al. (2005) found little correlation between the level of hospital merger activity
and any inpatient demand variable. Interestingly, the level of merger activity is uniformly
distributed across the major geographic regions. Importantly, they did not find an
association between HMO penetration and hospital merger activity.
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As in the premium analysis, we can test for the presence of factors that are
autocorrelated with MSA merger activity by adding leads and lags of MergerHHI mt to the
regression. 13 As long as these unobservable shocks are not coincident with MergerHHI mt ,
a prospect we believe is unlikely, the indirect tests of exogeneity of MergerHHI mt are
consistent with that hypothesis.
Finally, our theory predicts that hospital merger activity should impact
unconcentrated HMO markets more than concentrated ones, and part of our identification
strategy is to compare the impact of hospital mergers in concentrated HMO markets with
unconcentrated markets. For endogeneity to impact our conclusions the error terms in the
analysis would have to be correlated with MergerHHI mt only in some markets but not in
other markets.
Given that we believe that MergerHHI mt is exogenous in our analysis, it is an open
question of why some areas experienced significantly more hospital merger activity than
other areas. The literature has found that the role and influence of business consultants,
which differ significantly across hospitals, is associated with consolidation strategies
(APM/University Health System Consortium (1995); Burns and Pauly (2002); Bazzoli,
LoSasso, Arnould, and Shalowitz (2002); Burns, L.R., Bazzoli, G.J., Dynan, L. and
Wholey, D.R. (1997)). If the use of consultants is driven by management styles and those
styles are unrelated to other supply or demand shocks, it provides an account of the
variation in merger activity that is exogenous in our empirical specifications.

13

One possibility is that a decline in the percentage of the population that has private health insurance leads
to a decline in hospital demand and that provides an incentive for future hospital mergers in response to the
decline in demand. From conception to completion, hospital mergers take a significant amount of time (a
minimum of 2 years), thus unless hospitals can forecast these demand declines and organize a consolidation
response to them, hospital consolidation would occur in response to a contemporaneous shift in demand.
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V. Data
Our data come from three primary sources: The American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Survey, InterStudy, and the Current Population Survey. These data are
supplemented with information on location characteristics that are available from the
Census Bureau and the Area Resource File.
A. American Hospital Association Data
The AHA collects information on location, characteristics and ownership of over
95% of hospitals with 300 or more beds. We use annual data from 1990 to 2003, from
which we define a sample of private (i.e. non-government), short-term, acute care,
general medical and/or surgical hospitals. Psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals are
excluded from the analysis. Of particular interest is the AHA’s list of hospital mergers
which we use, along with the information on system change, to formulate our measures
of ownership structure. The AHA tracks hospital system affiliation and records
consolidation between hospitals if one hospital joins the system in which the other
hospital is a member. A consolidation can also occur if a hospital is deleted from the
AHA data and is listed as merging with another hospital. We use a “corrected” AHA
system ID constructed by Kristin Madison which has been updated by researchers at
Carnegie Mellon University. 14
B. InterStudy Data
The population of HMOs is specified using data from the InterStudy Census
(InterStudy, 1985-1987; InterStudy, 1988-2001) and the Group Health Association of

14

We thank Kristin Madison, Marty Gaynor and colleagues for providing us with this data. See Madison
(2004) for more information on this data.
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America (GHAA) HMO Directories. InterStudy and GHAA also are the sources for HMO
location, founding year, model type, not-for-profit status, federal qualification, national
affiliation, counties where the HMO operates, and enrollment information. The financial
data used to measure commercial premiums come from annual reports filed with state
regulators that have been collected by different organizations.
Into the HMO data we merged county-level market measures from the Area
Resource File (ARF) compiled by the Bureau of Health Professions of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. State-level wage data came from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. We obtained these reports and
surveys and linked them together. The method of aggregating data to the HMO level is
described in Town, Wholey and Feldman (2004).
Premiums are calculated as total premium revenue divided by total member
months for commercial products. The market boundaries used to calculate
MergerHHI jt are Health Services Areas (HSAs) (Makuc et al., 1991). A HSA is defined

as one or more counties that are relatively self-contained with respect to the provision of
routine hospital care. We then formulate the HMO level value of MergerHHI jt for each
HMO in each period by taking a weighted average of the estimated HMO enrollment (as
defined below) over the HSAs where it operates.
In the HMO premium regressions we include a broad set of variables formulated
from the InterStudy/GHAA/ARF data. These variables control for HMO and marketlevel characteristics that may be correlated with premiums and MergerHHI jt . The list of
control variables is provided in Table A1.
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Table 1 presents summary statistics for many of the variables used in the premium
analysis. Premiums rose modestly over the decade from an average $123 per member per
month in 1990 to $145 in 2000. Concordantly, the MergerHHI jt rose substantially from
.1686 in 1990 to .1886 in 2000, while there was little net change in average number of
HMO competitors. 15 There was also a significant change in the distribution of HMO
organizational forms over the decade. Network HMOs, Independent Practice
Organizations (IPAs) and group HMOs declined, while “Mixed” forms increased
substantially. 16 There was also a decrease in the percentage of not-for-profit HMOs from
70% in 1990 to 66% in 2000. 17 The percentage of enrollees from the Medicare and
Medicaid programs grew substantially over the decade. By 2000, on average, they
accounted for 6.7 and 9.6 percent of HMO enrollees, respectively. 18
C. Current Population Survey Data
To study the impact of hospital mergers on insurance take-up, we analyze data
from the March Supplement of the CPS from 1990 to 2003. The CPS is a large,
nationally representative survey of households. We limit our analysis to civilian adults
between the ages of 22 and 62 because the inclusion of the younger population introduces
the possibility that the Medicaid expansions may confound our estimates. 19 The CPS
provides information on whether an individual had health insurance from any source,
whether an individual had health insurance from a non-government source, age, race,
15

Over this period there was significant HMO entry. However, HMO consolidation apparently had an offsetting impact on HMO concentration.
16
These shifts suggest that premium trends may be associated with the organizational forms. In the analysis
of HMO premiums we control for this possibility using organizational form-specific time trends as well as
for-profit status time trends.
17
Town, Wholey and Feldman (2004) find that HMO for-profit status conversions had little effect on
premiums.
18
We do not have data for the number of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees by HMO for 1990.
19
Of course, many adults in our sample may qualify for Medicaid coverage.
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ethnicity, education, family size, household income, employment status, and the
employer size.
In 2000, the Census Bureau implemented significant changes in the CPS. The
most important for our purposes is a change in the health insurance questions. Prior to
2000, the Census Bureau used a “residual” approach to classify health insurance coverage
(Davern et al., 2003). The surveyors asked several yes/no questions about the types of
health insurance coverage held by the respondent. If the respondent answered “no” to all
the questions they were assumed not to have health insurance. In 2000, the survey was
modified to verify whether the person who answered “no” to all questions, in fact, did not
have health insurance. Approximately 8.1 percent of the 2001 respondents who did not
answer “yes” to the standard health insurance questions reported actually being insured
when asked. We recoded the 2000-2003 data so that it is consistent with earlier surveys. 20
We treat the relevant market for hospital services as the Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) because this is the smallest geographic unit in the CPS that we can merge
with the hospital consolidation data. We used the MSA code to match the individual
information to information on hospital and MergerHHI mt from the AHA and InterStudy
data. All AHA and InterStudy data are aggregated to the MSA level.
The MSA is not the ideal geographic market definition for the CPS analysis
because the geo-political boundaries of MSAs are not necessarily related to hospital
market boundaries. To address this problem we limit our sample to MSAs between
100,000 and 4,500,000 in 1990 population. The lower bound on the size of the MSA was
chosen because small MSAs may be too narrow to define hospital markets. Practically
20

This correction affects the magnitudes and precision of our estimates but not the qualitative conclusions.
See www.shadac.org for an algorithm to implement this correction.
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speaking, we also found few CPS observations from MSAs less than 100,000 in
population. An upper bound was selected because in large cities the MSA likely
overstates the boundary of the hospital market potentially introducing significant
measurement error in MergerHHI mt . 21 Observations that were not in an MSA were not
used to estimate the coefficients but are used in assessing the impact of hospital mergers
on welfare.
Instead of treating MSAs as markets, we would like to define the geographic
market boundaries using patient hospital choice information as in Kessler and McClellan
(2000). However, that exercise would require more detailed information on the location
of a household than is available in the CPS. Kessler and McClellan (2000) compared
their data-driven Herfindahl measures to Herfindahl indexes derived using a fixed circle
about the hospital to define markets and found conclusions regarding the impact of
competition were sensitive to how the concentration measures were formed. Because our
market definition is significantly different from the definition Kessler and McClellan
used to formulate their comparison HHI measure, the specific implication of their
findings for our results is unclear. But, we have attempted to assess the impact of
measurement error by estimating a model interacting MergerHHI mt with market size. The
idea is that if there is measurement error it is likely correlated with market size. Our
conclusions are robust to this specification. Nevertheless, the Kessler and McClellan
research results point out a limitation of our work – the possibility of measurement error
in market boundaries that translates into measurement error in the calculation
MergerHHI mt over time.

21

Again, our results are robust to a number of different thresholds and the exclusion of any thresholds.
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A list of control variables used in the analysis of insurance take-up is provided in
Table A1. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the CPS sample. The percentage of
individuals with private health insurance declined by two percentage points over the
decade and the percentage of individuals with any health insurance declined by three
percentage points. As in the HMO data, hospital concentration increased substantially
due to mergers. Over the decade the average MergerHHI mt increased to .2783 from an
initial level of .1909. Except for Hispanic status (which increased 10 percentage points),
most of the demographic variables were relatively constant over the sample period.

VI. Results
A. Impact of Hospital Mergers on HMO Premiums
Table 3 presents the fixed-effects regression coefficients of the logarithm of
average HMO premiums on the logarithms of average MergerHHI jt and the average
number of HMOs. In the full sample, the coefficients on both MergerHHI jt and
logarithm of NHMO are small and not significantly different from zero at traditional
levels of confidence.
The second column of Table 3 presents the estimates from the sample of HMOs
whose average NHMO is greater than or equal to ten. The coefficient on MergerHHI jt is
positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.83). For the other two HMO samples the estimated
coefficients on MergerHHI jt are small in magnitude and insignificant at traditional levels
of confidence. These results suggest that in less competitive HMO markets hospital
mergers redistribute market power rents between hospitals and HMOs and may not have
any impact of social welfare.
26

For HMOs that, on average, appear to face substantial competition, the coefficient
estimates imply an HMO premium elasticity of MergerHHI mt of .085. This estimate
implies that an increase in the average MergerHHI mt from .20 to .28 (this is the “standard
hospital merger” in Gaynor and Vogt (2000)) will increase average premiums by
approximately 2.9%. We can translate this premium increase into an implied increase in
the price of inpatient care. Hospital expenditures comprise about 30% of HMO
expenditures and if we assume a fixed-proportions technology and a 100% premium
pass-through, our estimate suggests that an increase in the average MergerHHI mt from .20
to .28 raised the average price of inpatient hospital services by approximately 10%. This
estimate is in the heart of the distribution of estimated price increases from the literature
on hospital competition discussed in Section II.
B. Impact of Hospital Mergers on Health Insurance Consumers
If hospital mergers raise the price of inpatient care, then they should affect the
quantity of health insurance consumed by consumers. We explore that possibility in this
section. As discussed above, we divide the merged CPS data into samples roughly
corresponding to thirds of the population-weighted, 1995 number of HMOs in an MSA.
Again, those samples are zero to six, seven to nine, and ten or greater HMOs.
Table 4 presents fixed-effects estimates of the likelihood of civilian adults having
private health insurance by degree of HMO competition. The first column of Table 4
presents the results from the entire sample. The coefficient of MergerHHI mt is negative,
small in magnitude and insignificant and the coefficient of the logarithm of the number of
HMOs is positive but not significant at traditional levels of confidence.
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Column (2) of Table 4 presents the estimate of the impact of hospital mergers on
the probability of having private health insurance for adults living in MSAs in the most
competitive HMO markets. The coefficient of MergerHHI mt is negative, large in
magnitude and significant at the 5% level of confidence (absolute value of t-statistic =
3.27). That is, hospital mergers in these MSAs are estimated to reduce the amount of
health insurance purchased from private sources. The coefficient estimates imply that a
hospital merger that an increase in MergerHHI mt from .20 to .28 reduces the likelihood of
having private insurance by .013. Using the estimates of the premium impacts from
hospital mergers presented above in combination with these estimates implies a private
insurance semi-elasticity (

ΔProb Private Insurance
) of -.45, which is in the middle of the
%Δ Premium

range of estimates from the literature. For example, at the high end of the spectrum
Gruber and Poterba (1994) estimate a semi-elasticity of demand for health insurance for
the self-employed of -1.8. At the low end Chernew, Cutler and Keenan (2005) estimate
the insurance semi-elasticity for private insurance to be -.10.
Table 5 presents the fixed-effects estimates of the likelihood of civilian adults
having health insurance from any source by the degree of HMO competition. The
patterns of coefficient estimates are similar to those presented in Table 4. In column (2)
of Table 5 the coefficient of MergerHHI mt for MSAs with ten or more HMOs in 1995 is .15 and is precisely estimated (absolute value of t-statistic = 2.54). Interestingly, this
coefficient is similar to the corresponding coefficient in Table 4. This result, along with
the results in Table 4, suggests that the vast majority individuals who drop private
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insurance because of a premium increase become uninsured. The coefficient estimates of
MergerHHI mt for the other MSA samples are small and insignificant.
The results of Table 3, 4 and 5 suggest that hospital mergers lead to increases in
health insurance premiums in competitive HMO markets, and the increases in HMO
premiums lead to a decline in private health insurance take-up and an increase in the
uninsurance rate. If hospital mergers cause health insurance premiums to increase, for a
number of reasons we should expect poorer individuals to be more sensitive to premium
increases and thus more affected by hospital mergers in competitive HMO markets. To
test this hypothesis, we formulate two samples from the CPS based on household income
and estimate the impact of hospital mergers on the likelihood that those living in MSAs
with competitive HMO markets possess private health insurance or any health insurance
at all. The first group comprises individuals with household income under $60,000, and
the second group is individuals with household income above $60,000.
Table 6 presents the results of this exercise. The coefficient estimates indicate that
hospital mergers reduced the likelihood of acquiring private insurance for the low-income
group. In column (1), the coefficient on MergerHHI mt is -.22 and significant at the 5%
level. For the upper-income sample (column (2)) hospital mergers did not significantly
affect the likelihood of private insurance take-up. This pattern also holds when the
dependent variable is the presence of any insurance. The coefficient on MergerHHI mt is .20 and the absolute value of the t-statistic is 2.53. The results in Table 6 are consistent
with hospital mergers leading to higher health insurance premiums in unconcentrated
HMO markets, with the impact of the premium increases on insurance take-up limited to
the poorer half of the income distribution.
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C. Robustness
Table 7 presents the most important of many robustness checks we performed on
these analyses. The most obvious concern is that MergerHHI mt is endogenous. That is,
unobserved shocks to insurance may drive hospital mergers. To test this possibility we
included two-year leads and lags of MergerHHI mt as additional right-hand side variables.
The logic underlying this test is that unobserved trends in insurance may be correlated
with hospital mergers but this correlation is unlikely to be contemporaneous. So
if MergerHHI mt is endogenous, a marker would be correlation between the leading or
lagged values and insurance take-up. In addition, if hospital consolidation ultimately
leads to efficiencies that are passed on in the form of lower prices but those efficiencies
take some time to realize then coefficients of the lagged values of MergerHHI mt should
be positive.
The first column in Table 7 presents the results with inclusion of the two-year
leading and lagged values of MergerHHI mt . In this specification, MergerHHI mt is
negative and significant at the 1% level while the coefficients of both the lead and lag
values MergerHHI mt are small in magnitude and insignificant. 22 These results suggest that
endogeneity is not an issue. Furthermore, the results do not indicate that hospitals are able
to achieve efficiencies through merger over time and pass them on to consumers in the
form of lower health insurance premiums.

22

In a regression of health insurance status on contemporaneous, one and two-year lagged values of
MergerHHI mt , the coefficients on the lagged values of MergerHHI mt are small and insignificant while the

coefficient on contemporaneous MergerHHI mt is large. This suggests that our results are robust to potential
measurement differences in the reported time of insurance status and hospital consolidation.
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Columns (2) – (5) of Table 7 present the results using different HMO
concentration cut-off values to define the most competitive HMO markets. Consistent
with our theory, the coefficient on MergerHHI mt declines as the threshold on the number
of HMOs decreases. Above eight HMOs the coefficient becomes insignificant in the
private health insurance take-up regression, while the coefficient becomes insignificant
above nine HMOs in the regression for any health insurance.
We re-estimated the coefficients on the sample that excluded the years 19901992, 1994-1996, and 1998-2000. The coefficient estimates and standard errors were not
meaningfully different than those presented in Tables 3 and 4. We also dropped MSAs
with very large and very small changes in the private health insurance rate to see if our
estimates are sensitive to outliers. Again, the coefficients and standard error estimates
from this analysis are in line with results present above.
We estimated the model using different definitions of the hospital organizational
boundary. Specifically, we define an organization as one that generates one financial
report in the AHA data. Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) found that hospital mergers where
the newly formed organization consolidated its financial reports generated significant
cost reductions. These results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Consistent with
the results of Dranove and Lindrooth (2004), changes in hospital concentration using this
definition of the hospital organization did not impact health insurance take-up.
D. The Welfare Impact of Hospital Mergers 1990 -2003
Table 8 shows the effect of an implied increase in HMO premiums due to hospital
consolidations from 1990 onwards. Premium increases as a consequence of hospital
consolidation were very modest until the late 1990s but by 2001, the last year for which
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we have premium data, our estimates imply that HMO premiums were 3.2% higher than
they would have been absent horizontal hospital consolidation.
Table 9 examines the impact of hospital consolidation on health insurance take-up
rates. By the late 1990s, hospital mergers had a modest but non-trivial impact on health
insurance take-up. In 2003, the rate of private insurance is estimated to be .0046 lower
because of hospital consolidation, while the uninsurance rate is estimated to be .0043
higher. This translates into approximately 695,000 (.5%) fewer covered lives in private
health insurance with most of these (650,000) joining the ranks of the uninsured. Over the
entire 14 years of our sample, we estimate that private insurance decreased by 5.9 million
covered life-years and uninsurance increased by 5.5 million covered life-years.
Using the estimates from Tables 8 and 9 we can calculate rough, back-of-theenvelope estimates of the welfare loss (and the decomposition of that loss) from hospital
consolidations during our study time period. We estimate the change in consumer surplus
and the dead weight loss in the simplest possible way – we assume a linear demand
function and constant marginal cost. There are numerous limitations associated with this
exercise. We do not account for heterogeneity in preferences and in health insurance plan
structures. We also assume that the premium increases due to hospital mergers we
estimate for HMOs apply to all forms of private health insurance. We do not account for
the possibility that hospital mergers may result in efficiencies that can increase hospital
profits. 23 We also are not taking into account the impact of hospital mergers on the use of
inpatient services by either the insured or uninsured or the structure of insurers hospital

23

Dranove and Lindrooth (2004) estimate that hospital mergers in which the hospitals consolidate their
financial statements result in cost reductions of approximately 14%.
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networks. 24 Finally, we consider only the net decline in insurance coverage – those
people who lost private coverage but gained public coverage are not considered to have
lost any consumer surplus.
Table 10 presents these calculations. Recall that our sample is civilian adults
between ages 22 and 62. By 2001, hospital consolidations reduced consumer surplus for
this sample by $7.4 billion (about 2.8% of total private insurance revenues) or $49.82 per
capita. From 1990 to 2001, total consumer surplus was reduced by $42.2 billion. Total
welfare loss was quite modest, however. By 2001, net welfare loss from horizontal
hospital consolidations was a mere $19.7 million and the total net welfare loss from 1990
to 2001 was $95.7 million. That is, it appears that the primary impact of hospital mergers
was to transfer consumer surplus to hospitals.

VII. Conclusion
The hospital industry enjoyed reduced antitrust scrutiny while it consolidated in
the 1990s. Our work suggests that hospital consolidation resulted in non-trivial
consequences for health insurance consumers. Hospital consolidation caused private
insurance rolls to decrease and the number of US residents without health insurance to
increase. Thus, if the goal of antitrust policy is to prevent consolidations that reduce
consumer surplus independent of the impact on profits, then during the 1990s the courts’
rulings on hospital mergers ran counter to this goal. Currently, the Federal Trade
24

It is possible that insurers react to increased hospital prices by increasing inpatient co-pays and that, in
turn, would impact enrollee welfare. We are not in possession of the data to explore this possibility.
However, our results suggest that the majority of the changes in hospital prices are passed along in the form
of premium increases in competitive HMO markets. Ho (2006) has analyzed the impact of restricted
hospital network choice on health insurance beneficiaries and finds that selective contracting leads to $1
billion in societal welfare loss across 43 metropolitan areas. Estimating the impact of hospital mergers on
HMO network structure is a formidable task and beyond the scope of this paper. Ho (2005) has made some
progress on this problem.
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Commission is reviewing and in some cases challenging consummated hospital
consolidations. Our work suggests that such challenges may be justified. However, if the
purpose of antitrust policy is to prohibit only those mergers that reduce total welfare, a
view with which many economists concur, then our results suggest that the courts were
correct in their assessment of the impact of hospital mergers. There was very little
welfare loss from hospital consolidations during the 1990s.
Our work also makes a modest contribution to merger analysis when the merging
firms are upstream from the final product. The important point we make there is that the
impact of an upstream merger on the final consumers is a function of the downstream
market structure.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of HMO estimation sample
Year
Variable

Full Sample

HMO Premium
(2000 dollars)

1990

1995

2001

$133.62
(26.86)
.1766
(.1092)
9.39
(4.17)
127,941
(243,889)
12.6
(8.73)

$122.62
(24.74)
.1686
(.976)
8.91
(5.05)
73,806
(164,190)
8.6
(7.6)

$136.20
(26.73)
.1710
(.111)
9.38
(3.86)
111,744
(204,271)
12.1
(8.5)

$145.55
(26.70)
.1868
(.1157)
8.26
(2.77)
212,024
(360,957)
17.3
(9.07)

Percent For-Profit

68.5

66.4

69.7

70.7

Percent Network
HMO

9.3

13.8

8.3

10.9

Percent IPA HMO

58.3

65.4

59.3

50.9

6.4

10.4

6.8

2.6

4.4

8.5

3.4

1.1

21.7

1.9

22.1

34.5

4.3

--

3.6

6.7

6.4

--

5.6

9.6

3,340

318

350

267

MergerHHI jt

Average Number
of HMOs
Enrollment
Age in Years

Percent Group
HMO
Percent Staff
HMO
Mixed HMO
Percent
Enrollment
Medicare
Percent
Enrollment
Medicaid
N

Note: Means are not weighted by enrollment
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Table 2
Summary statistics of CPS sample
Means and standard deviations in parentheses

1990
.81
(.38)
.82
(.38)
38.2
(10.5)
.45
(.50)
.64
(.48)
.87
(.33)
.084
(.28)
.086
(.28)

Year
1997
.80
(.40)
.82
(.39)
39.5
(10.3)
.47
(.50)
.64
(.48)
.86
(.34)
.086
(.28)
.12
(.33)

2003
.80
(.40)
.83
(.34)
40.4
(10.2)
.47
(.50)
.65
(.48)
.83
(.37)
.099
(.30)
.14
(.35)

.31
(.46)

.30
(.45)

.30
(.45)

.31
(.45)

Number of
HMOs

.03
(.18)
.80
(.39)
.078
(.25)
.45
(.50)
$68,070
(53,590)
.2395
(.17)
7.90
(4.00)

.04
(.19)
.81
(.38)
.064
(.24)
.41
(.49)
$63,037
(41,093)
.1909
(.14)
5.11
(3.17)

.03
(.18)
.81
(.38)
.041
(.20)
.47
(.50)
$67,877
(57,337)
.2490
(.17)
10.1
(4.3)

.03
(.18)
.81
(.36)
.053
(.22)
.45
(.50)
$74,177
(63,447)
.2783
(.18)
7.63
(3.43)

N

467,136

32,532

31,253

52,160

Variable

All Years

Private Health
Insurance
Any Health
Insurance

.80
(.40)
.82
(.39)
39.4
(10.4)
.46
(.50)
.64
(.48)
.86
(.35)
.089
(.28)
.11
(.32)

Age
Female
Married
White
Black
Hispanic
Bachelors or
Advanced
Degree
Union Member
Full Time
Worker
Unemployed
Employer ≥
1,000 employees
Household
Income
MergerHHI mt
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Table 3
Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on HMO Premiums
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)
Variable

Dependent Variable is Logarithm of HMO Premium
Sample
1995 Mean
1995 Mean
Number
1995 Mean
HMOs ≥ 7 &
Full Sample
Number
Number
HMOs ≥ 10
HMOs <7
HMOs <10
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Log Hospital Merger
HHI

.0026
(.0051)

.085**
(.030)

-.043
(.037)

-.00071
(.0098)

Log Average
Number of HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number HMOs

-.011
(.020)
.25
.12
3,345
374

.056
(.038)
.28
.077
1,435
159

.0020
(.017)
.32
.22
875
97

-.059
(.034)
.31
.078
1,035
118

Note: Right hand side variables include age of the HMO, mean HSA per capita income, mean HSA
population, mean percent HSA with collage degree, mean HSA poverty rate, mean HSA hospital beds per
capita, mean percent HSA over 64 years of age, mean HSA MDs per capita, mean HSA unemployment
rate, mean HSA population density, mean HSA nurse wage, the mean distribution of employers across size
categories, time trends interacted with HMO type and annual dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the
HMO level.
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on
Probability of Private Health Insurance for MSA under 4,000,000 in population
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)

Variable

Merger HHI
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance
Sample
1995 Number
1995 Number
1995 Number
of HMOs ≥ 6
of HMOs ≥ 10
of HMOs < 6
Full Sample
& < 10
(2)
(1)
(2)
(2)
-.0073
-.16**
.0015
.040
(.024)
(.049)
(.035)
(.041)
.0011
-.0072
.018*
-.0062
(.0024)
(.0079)
(.0080)
(.0038)
.25
.25
.25
.24
.25
.24
.25
.24
509,178
225,267
155,039
128,872
250
57
74
119

Right hand side variables include age, household income, household income squared, household income
cubed, family size, household income per family member, indicators for race, Hispanic status, employment
status, union status, marital status, high school graduate, college graduate, post-baccalaureate education,
veteran status, household income interacted with martial status, household income interacted with female,
time trend interacted with bottom decile of income distribution, time trend interacted with 2nd decile of
income distribution, time trend interacted with fulltime work status, time trend interacted with household
income, employer size indicators, occupational indicators, industry indicators, MSA per capita income,
MSA population, percent MSA with collage degree, MSA hospital beds per capita, percent MSA over 64
years of age, MSA MDs per capita, MSA unemployment rate, MSA hospital beds per capita and annual
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
**
Significant at the 1% level.
*
Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on
Probability of Any Health Insurance
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)

Variable

Merger HHI
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Dependent Variable is Indicator of Any Insurance
Sample
1995 Number
1995 Number
1995 Number
of HMOs ≥ 6
of HMOs ≥ 10
of HMOs < 6
Full Sample
& < 10
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)
.0069
.038
-.0073
-.15**
(.059)
(.050)
(.040)
(.024)
.00032
-.0091
.016
-.0055
(.0036)
(.0062)
(.0088)
(.0040)
.19
.19
.19
.17
.19
.18
.19
.18
509,178
225,267
155,039
128,872
250
57
74
119

Note: See Table 4 for list of control variables.
**
Significant at the 1% level.
*
Significant at the 5% level.
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Table 6
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation on
Probability of Private or Any Health Insurance by Household Income
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance
Sample is 1995 Number of HMOs ≥ 10
Variable

Merger HHI
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Dependent Variable is Private
Insurance

Dependent Variable is Any
Insurance

Household Income
under $60,000
(1)

Household Income
above $60,000
(2)

Household Income
under $60,000
(3)

Household Income
above $60,000
(4)

-.22**
(.079)
-.0038
(.012)
.19
.16
90,664
57

-.051
(.062)
-.014
(.0095)
.13
.14
86,225
57

-.20**
(.079)
-.0029
(.012)
.17
.16
90,664
57

-.048
(.056)
-.013
(.0071)
.13
.13
86,225
57

Note: See Table 4 for a list of controls variables.
*
Significant at the 5% level.
**
Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7
Robustness Analysis
MSA Fixed Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Consolidation
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance
Variable

Merger HHI
Merger
HHI(t+2)
Merger
HHI (t-2)
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

1995
Number of
HMOs ≥ 10

1995
Number of
HMOs ≥ 12

1995
Number of
HMOs ≥ 11

1995
Number of
HMOs ≥ 9

1995
Number of
HMOs ≥ 8

(1)
-.17*
(.070)
-.047
(.057)
.10
(.061)
-.0029
(.012)
.26
.22
132,273
57

(2)
-.24**
(.065)

(3)
-.24**
(.051)

(4)
-.12**
(.043)

(5)
-.074*
(.036)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

.0089
(.014)
.25
.24
99,873
22

-.0031
(.010)
.25
.24
161,077
40

-.0073
(.0068)
.25
.21
247,575
68

-.017
(.0045)
.25
.23
308,984
88

Variable
Merger HHI
Merger
HHI(t+2)
Merger
HHI (t-2)
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Dependent Variable is Indicator of Any Insurance
-.17*
(.065)
-.022
(.067)
.083
(.071)
-.022
(.067)
.20
.17
132,273
57

-.27**
(.087)

-.23**
(.058)

-.11*
(.044)

-.062
(.037)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

.0060
(.010)
.19
.19
99,873
22

.0015
(.0090)
.19
.19
161,077
40

-.0072
(.0055)
.19
.17
247,575
68

-.0025
(.0059)
.19
.18
308,984
88

Note: See Table 4 for a list of controls.
*
Significant at the 5% level.
**
Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Mean Annual Per-Member Premium and Mean Percentage
Change in Premium Due to Hospital Mergers
(Means weighted by HMO Enrollment)

Year

Annual Premium
(2000 dollars)

Percentage
Increase in
Premiums due to
Hospital Mergers
Across all HMOs

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

$1,488
$1,584
$1,704
$1,716
$1,728
$1,656
$1,524
$1,548
$1,584
$1,668
$1,752
$1,896

-.16
.33
.66
1.2
1.9
2.2
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.2

46

Percentage Increase
in Premiums due to

-.26
.54
1.1
2.1
3.2
3.8
4.7
5.1
5.2
5.4
5.3

Hospital Mergers
For HMOs in
“Competitive HMO
Markets”

Table 9
Estimated Impact of Hospital Mergers on Quantity of Health Insurance for US Civilian
Adults

Year

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Sum

Estimated
25-65
Estimated
Private
Change
Civilian
Change in
Health
Uninsurance
in Private
Population
Uninsured
Insurance
Rate
Insurance
(millions)
Rate
Rate
Rate

126.3
128.5
130.6
132.6
134.6
136.7
138.9
141.1
143.0
144.9
146.2
147.7
149.5
151.3

.787
.778
.771
.756
.773
.786
.783
.781
.777
.780
.789
.793
.802
.789

.182
.190
.193
.206
.190
.180
.182
.182
.191
.190
.190
.181
.168
.178

--.00017
-.00032
-.00075
-.0014
-.0026
-.0030
-.0040
-.0045
-.0047
-.0048
-.0050
-.0047
-.0046
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-.00016
.00030
.00070
.0013
.0024
.0028
.0037
.0042
.0045
.0047
.0044
.0044
.0043

Estimated
Decrease
in Private
Insurance
Roles

Estimated
Increase in
Uninsured
Population

--21,845
20,560
41,792
39,180
99,450
92,820
188,440
174,980
355,420
328,080
416,700
388,920
564,400
522,070
643,500
600,600
681,030
652,050
701,760
687,140
738,500
649,880
702,650
657,800
695,980
650,590
5,851,467 5,464,670

Table 10
Estimated Welfare Impact of Hospital Mergers 1990-2001

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Sum

Loss in Consumer
Surplus
($1,000)
--263,819
588,588
1,192,934
2,262,577
3,532,086
3,785,930
5,014,070
5,511,716
6,085,774
6,612,866
7,358,982
42,209,342
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Per capita Loss in
Consumer Surplus
($)
--2.05
4.51
9.00
16.81
25.84
27.26
35.54
38.54
42.00
45.23
49.82
296.60

Total Dead
Weight Loss
($1,000)
--26
109
525
1,814
5,161
6,468
11,314
14,270
16,858
19,129
19,714
95,388

Figure 1
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Number of Hospital M&As

Number of M&As

Mean Population-Weighted Hospital Concentration and
Number of Horizontal Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions -- 1990-2003

Table A1
Control Variables for HMO Premium and Insurance Take-up Analysis
HMO Premium Control Variables
HMO Variables
HSA Variables
HSA Penetration Rate

Log of enrollment
Trend and Trend
squared interacted with
FP, IPA, Network,
Mixed indicators
Log of HMO Age

Insurance Take-Up Control Variables
Individual Variables
MSA Variables

Percent of
Establishments with 50
to 99 employees
Percent of
Establishments with 50
to 99 employees

Age
Age2
Female
Married
Divorced
Widowed

Percent FP Hospitals
MDs per capita
Hospital Beds per capita
Log of MSA population
Log of MSA per-capita
Income

Percent of
Establishments with 100
to 249 employees

Black
Asian
Hispanic

Unemployment Rate
Percent of population
with college degrees

Percent of
Establishments with 250
to 499 employees
Percent of
Establishments with 500
to 999 employees
Percent of
Establishments with
1,000 or more
employees

Veteran Status
Union Status
Log of Family Size
Household Income
Household Income2
Household Income3
Household Income ×
Married
Household Income ×
Female
Per-capita Household
Income
Bottom 10% Income ×
trend
Bottom 20% Income ×
trend
Indicators for
Employer’s Size
Educational Attainment
Indicators
Work Status Indicator
Industry Indicators
Occupation Indicators

Log of RN Wages

MDs per capita
Log of per capita
income
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
Log of number of
establishments
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Trend interacted with
1990 Hospital HHI

Table A2
MSA Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Impact of Hospital Mergers
(system expansions not included) on Probability of
Private Health Insurance for MSA under 4,500,000 in population
(bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis)

Variable

Merger HHI
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Variable

Merger HHI
Log Number of
HMOs
Within R2
Overall R2
N
Number MSAs

Dependent Variable is Indicator of Private Insurance
Sample
1995 Number
1995 Number
1995 Number
of HMOs ≥ 6
of HMOs ≥ 10
of HMOs < 6
Full Sample
& < 10
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)
-.035
.032
.0040
-.033
(.098)
(.046)
(.040)
(.033)
.0011
-.0080
.018*
-.0060
(.0039)
(.0070)
(.0071)
(.0045)
.25
.25
.25
.24
.25
.23
.25
.24
509,178
225,267
155,039
128,872
250
57
74
119
Dependent Variable is Indicator of Any Insurance
Sample
1995 Number
1995 Number
1995 Number
of HMOs ≥ 6
of HMOs ≥ 10
of HMOs < 6
Full Sample
& < 10
(2)
(1)
(2)
(2)
.022
.052
-.010
.037
(.029)
(.12)
(.042)
(.038)
.00026
-.0095
.016*
-.0050
(.0028)
(.0071)
(.0080)
(.0054)
.19
.19
.19
.17
.19
.18
.19
.17
509,178
225,267
155,039
128,872
250
57
74
119

Note: See Table 4 for list of control variables.
*
Significant at the 5% level.
**
Significant at the 1% level.
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